Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

2 May 2007

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

United Kingdom report on implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

1. The United Kingdom has consistently supported resolutions in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. The United Kingdom also supports the First Committee resolution on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. We continue to call upon Israel to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to conclude a full-scope Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We have recently reiterated these calls in meetings with Israeli officials.

2. The United Kingdom, with international partners, continues to seek ways to resolve the increasing crisis over the status of Iran's nuclear programme. States parties to the NPT undertake obligations towards non-proliferation when they ratify the NPT, as well as benefiting from rights.

3. In this context we deplore the fact that Iran has so far failed to meet its obligations under Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007). We call again on Iran to take the steps required by the international community and made mandatory by these resolutions. Iran's failure to take these steps, and increasing lack of cooperation with IAEA, further undermines confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and efforts to establish a Middle East weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone.

4. The United Kingdom has taken steps with other countries in the region to establish the conditions for a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Together with our European Union partners, we have carried out extensive lobbying activity to secure adherence by States in the Middle East to key non-proliferation agreements. Since the last Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we have lobbied States in the region on the question of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the IAEA Additional Protocol.

5. We also recognize the impact that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has on international efforts to create a weapons-of-mass-destruction-

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free zone in the region. The United Kingdom is committed to efforts to move the Middle East peace process forward. We are actively engaged in efforts to end the violence, build confidence and resume talks based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 1397 (2002) and the principle of "land for peace".

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

2 May 2007

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"

Report submitted by the Republic of Korea

Introduction

1. As stated in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in the section entitled, "Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12", paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, the Conference agreed on the submission of regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. In this regard, the Republic of Korea hereby submits its report to the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

2. The Republic of Korea firmly believes that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is an indispensable part of the core bargain founded on the three pillars of the NPT. The disarmament obligations by nuclear-weapon States laid out in article VI of the Treaty are fundamental to the full implementation of the Treaty. Faced with the unprecedented challenges from the cases of non-compliance with the Treaty and its safeguards systems, the revelation of a clandestine nuclear black market network led by A. Q. Khan, and the potential nexus of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, it is imperative that the international community maintain and strengthen all three pillars of the NPT.

3. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Republic of Korea continues to abide by its commitment, pursuant to the Treaty, not to receive the transfer of, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

4. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference marked a significant achievement in the field of nuclear disarmament. The guidelines laid out in the

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Document, particularly the 13 practical steps therein, serve not only as a measuring stick to gauge progress in this field, but as a road map toward achieving the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.

5. Since the adoption of the Final Document in 2000, there have been ever-increasing expectations for progress in the implementation of disarmament and transparency measures, particularly on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. The five nuclear-weapon States should put their unequivocal commitment to disarmament into action by making systematic and progressive efforts. The Republic of Korea welcomes the significant progress made thus far in the reduction of nuclear arsenals and the commitments to further reductions under the Moscow Treaty.

6. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea hopes for deeper cuts and further engagements by nuclear-weapon States. The Republic of Korea recognizes that there is a perception gap between the record of nuclear-weapon States and the level of expectations held by non-nuclear-weapon States. Closing this perception gap will certainly provide nuclear-weapon States with the moral authority and the political legitimacy to strengthen non-proliferation norms while maintaining the delicate balance among the three pillars of the Treaty.

7. It was disappointing that the 2005 NPT Review Conference could not produce a substantive document. It was also regrettable that the 2005 United Nations World Summit could not agree on a disarmament and non-proliferation chapter in the Outcome Document. The Republic of Korea strongly hopes that the first Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2010 NPT Review Conference to be held in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May 2007 will yield fruitful results.

Implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" included in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference

Step 1: The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

8. The Republic of Korea has attached great importance to the achievement of an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Republic of Korea ratified the Treaty on 24 September 1999. The Republic of Korea calls for the early signing and ratification of the Treaty by those States that have not yet done so, particularly those 10 remaining annex 2 States whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force.

9. The Republic of Korea supports the biennial Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT and the Final Declarations adopted at each Conference. Preparations are under way for the fifth one in Vienna in September 2007. These article XIV conferences are intended to review ways and means to promote the Treaty's entry into force at the earliest possible date. We also support the CTBT Ministerial Meeting that has been held during the intervening period between the above-mentioned conferences. The Republic of Korea Foreign Minister attended these meetings and signed the Joint Ministerial Statement, thereby

contributing to strengthening the momentum towards the early entry into force of the Treaty.

10. As part of its efforts to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty, the Republic of Korea hosted a regional workshop on CTBTO International Cooperation for States of South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East in Seoul in October 2005, in cooperation with the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO.

Step 2: A moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty

11. It is our considered view that all countries, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, particularly in the aftermath of the nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 9 October 2006.

12. It is the view of the Republic of Korea that such a voluntary moratorium cannot replace the legally binding commitments through the signing and ratification of the CTBT. The Republic of Korea has therefore continued to urge those States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible time.

13. The Republic of Korea has continued to support the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat and its efforts to establish the international monitoring system for the verification of the Treaty. We note that, as of the end of 2006, more than two thirds of the 321 stations required by the Treaty have been built. The only monitoring station (primary seismic) of the Republic of Korea was certified by the Provisional Technical Secretariat in October 2006.

Step 3: The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years

14. The Republic of Korea attaches great importance to the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral forum for negotiating disarmament agreements. It is regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament has not yet been able to agree on the programme of work. As a next logical step toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, it is imperative that the Conference on Disarmament immediately begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

15. The Republic of Korea believes that a FMCT is the issue ripe for negotiations among the core issues, given the strong support for it expressed for several years in the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should start negotiations on a FMCT immediately and without preconditions, keeping in mind the 1995 Shannon mandate without prejudice to the outcome on verification. Pending the conclusion of the FMCT, all States should declare or observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

Step 4: The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body

16. The Republic of Korea hopes that the breakthrough in the Conference on Disarmament will pave the way for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to address nuclear disarmament, as agreed in this step. In this regard, appointment of a coordinator for substantive discussion on nuclear disarmament, as suggested in the draft decision of the six Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament, would be a good start. The Republic of Korea has been actively participating in the structured, intensive discussions on all substantive issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, including nuclear disarmament issues.

Step 5: The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures

17. It is the view of the Republic of Korea that irreversibility is one of the fundamental principles for nuclear disarmament measures. It is only irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons that can ensure that redeployment will not be possible. The Republic of Korea shares the view that the principle of irreversibility should be applied to all disarmament and arms control measures.

Step 6: An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI

18. The Republic of Korea continues to highlight the importance of reaffirming commitments on the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. The Republic of Korea considers the unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI, as one of the major achievements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. While acknowledging the efforts made thus far by the nuclear-weapon States for a reduction of their nuclear arsenals, the Republic of Korea has been encouraging them to further continue these efforts in this respect.

Step 7: The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems ("the ABM Treaty") as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reduction of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions

19. The Republic of Korea welcomes the entry into force of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (the Moscow Treaty) between the Russian Federation and the United States in June 2003. While the Moscow Treaty represents a positive step, we encourage the nuclear-weapon States to further engage in reductions in nuclear stockpiles.

Step 8: The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency

20. The Republic of Korea supports the completion and full implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and the IAEA. Efforts could be made to expand this initiative to all nuclear-weapon-capable States, as an important step in the direction of international control of excessive stocks of fissile material and deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals.

Step 9: Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all

21. The implementation of these steps is primarily the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States. The Republic of Korea is of the view that transparency measures are an important voluntary confidence-building measure and, as a matter of principle, transparency should be applied to all disarmament and arms control efforts. There should be progress toward reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, as part of overall nuclear disarmament. And the nuclear-weapon States should diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their nuclear doctrines.

Step 10: Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes

22. The Republic of Korea supports and encourages such arrangements by the nuclear-weapon States.

Step 11: Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control

23. The Republic of Korea is actively participating in international efforts towards the control over or dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, as well as conventional weapons. The Republic of Korea is a State party to all major disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and conventions, including the NPT, CTBT, CWC and BWC. The Republic of Korea believes that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Step 12: Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996

24. The Republic of Korea believes that national reporting on the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures enhances transparency and builds confidence, and therefore should be encouraged. The Republic of Korea encourages both nuclear-

weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to submit regular reports to the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference. While there is no consensus on the content and format of national reports, more detailed information contained in them will instil greater confidence in the States' nuclear policies and disarmament efforts.

Step 13: The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world

25. The Republic of Korea fully supports the essential role of the IAEA as a competent authority responsible for the verification and assurance of compliance with the NPT obligations. The Republic of Korea continues to urge those States which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA to do so. To strengthen the Agency's effectiveness in verifying compliance and detecting non-compliance, it is crucial to promote the universality of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and make it the verification standard of today. The Republic of Korea supports the further development of the verification capabilities of the nuclear disarmament agreements.

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

7 May 2007
English
Original: Chinese and English

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Steps to advance the Middle East peace process and to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

Report submitted by China

China has always followed closely the development of the situation in the Middle East, attached importance to advancing the Middle East peace process, and actively supported the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In accordance with provisions of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, China has taken the following steps to advance the Middle East peace process and to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East:

1. China supports and is committed to bilateral and multilateral efforts to advancing the Middle East peace process.

As a permanent member of the Security Council, China continuously pays close attention to developments in the Middle East and works vigorously to facilitate and promote the peace process in that region. Through many different bilateral and multilateral channels, China continues to advocate peace talks, urging Israel and Palestine to resolve their territorial disputes through political negotiations. By so doing, China has played a unique role in facilitating the Middle East peace process.

(1) Working bilaterally with Arab countries and Israel

Over the past two years, the Chinese Government has maintained close bilateral relations with countries in the Middle East, actively engaged in bilateral exchanges, and urged Palestine and Israel to establish mutual trust and to reopen peace negotiations.

As the situation in the Middle East has developed, President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and other Chinese leaders have responded to the concerns of countries in the region and expressed China's position on the Middle East peace process through correspondence with regional leaders. China has also conducted high-level visits to countries concerned. In April 2006, State Councillor Hua

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Jianmin visited Egypt. In June 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao paid an official visit to Egypt. In May 2005, the Chairman of the Palestine National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, paid a state visit to China. In December 2005, the King of Jordan, Abdullah II bin Al Hussein, made an official visit to China. In July 2006, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of Israel, Tzachi Hanegbi, met with the Chinese Foreign Minister in Beijing. In November 2006, the President of Egypt, Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, paid a state visit to China. In January 2007, the Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert, visited China.

Government exchanges at various levels were also frequently held between China and the Middle Eastern countries concerned. In June 2005, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, and provided US$ 1 million cash remittance and construction materials worth 10 million yuan renminbi to Palestine. In July 2005, Ahmad Mohammad Ahmad, member of the central committee of the Syrian National Progressive Front and secretary-general of the Arab Socialist Movement, made a visit to China. In August 2005, Wang Jiarui, Minister of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, visited Israel and Palestine. In September 2005, Abbas Zaki, Delegate-General of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Fatah Movement visited China. In March 2006, Minister Wang Jiarui visited Lebanon. In May 2006, Walid al-Moualem, the foreign minister of Syria, paid an official visit to China. In December 2006, Abulaiti Abudurexiti, the Vice-Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, led a delegation to visit Syria. Also in December 2006, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun visited Israel, Palestine and Syria.

In addition, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing has made many telephone calls to the leaders or foreign ministers of countries in the Middle East to exchange views on the Middle East issue. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has also held political consultations with Syria and Israel respectively, emphasizing that steadily advancing the Middle East peace process through peaceful negotiations was the most fundamental and effective way to resolve the Middle East issue.

(2) Promoting peace talks in multilateral situations

In June 2005, the Second Senior Officials' Meeting of the Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum was held in Beijing. In May 2006, the second Ministerial conference and the Third Senior Officials' Meeting took place in Beijing. At these meetings, China worked with parties concerned to promote the Middle East peace process.

In 2005 and 2006, during the sixtieth and sixty-first United Nations General Assemblies, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing met with the representatives of Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, and also attended the Ministerial Meeting of the Security Council on the issue of the Middle East.

In May 2007, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi attended the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) conference held in Egypt, and submitted four suggestions on implementing the compact. During the conference he also exchanged views with many other prominent delegates.

Furthermore, China also worked with countries concerned to promote the Middle East peace process during the Sino-Africa Summit held in Beijing in 2006.

(3) Actively participating in international efforts to promote the Middle East peace process through mediation by China's special envoy on the Middle East issue

In June 2006, China's special envoy on the Middle East issue Sun Bigan visited Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Palestine, and exchanged views on the regional situation in the Middle East. In August, the special envoy visited Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, focused on mediating the Israel-Lebanon Conflict.

In August 2006, the special envoy participated at the ministerial level in the Conference for Lebanon's Early Recovery and the International Donor Conference on the Humanitarian Situation in the Palestinian Territories, held in Stockholm, where he announced that China would provide 20 million yuan renminbi in humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese Government. In January 2007, the special envoy attended the International Conference on Aid to Lebanon, held in Paris, France, and again offered 50 million yuan renminbi in free assistance grants to Lebanon. In April 2007, the special envoy visited Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Israel and the European Union, discussing the situation between Palestine and Israel and in the Middle East.

(4) Using media spokespersons and other means to expound China's position, and advocate the peaceful resolution of the Middle East question

The Chinese Foreign Ministry follows closely developments in the Middle East, and expounds China's views and position on the situation through press releases by the spokespersons of the Ministry.

In October 2005, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing conducted written interviews with reporters for the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram and October magazine.

(5) Providing platforms for dialogue among Palestine and Israeli peace advocates

In December 2006, the Chinese Foreign Ministry held the Israel-Palestine Seminar on the Peace Process in the Middle East. Peace advocates from Israel and Palestine discussed how to ease the tense Middle East situation as well as how to advance the Middle East peace process, and issued a joint statement after the seminar.

2. China supports efforts towards establishing the Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone.

China has been unconditionally committed to the non-use or threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and has always supported the efforts of countries in various regions to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on a basis of voluntary consultation. In its statement upon accession to the NPT in 1992, China made a solemn appeal that "nuclear-weapon states undertake to support proposals to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding obligations".

China holds that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is conducive to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. Proliferation of nuclear weapons would be more dangerous in regions where tensions are high. For this reason, China has

unequivocally supported the Middle East countries in their efforts to establish the Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone from the very start, believing that it would contribute to easing tension in the region and facilitating the settlement of the Middle East question. In the current situation, the establishment of the Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is of the greatest importance.

China has been supporting efforts to establish the Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone within the framework of the United Nations. Every year since 1974, the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the resolution sponsored by Egypt on the establishment of the Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Egyptian President Mubarak has also put forth an initiative to establish a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone and appealed to all countries in the Middle East to make vigorous efforts and conduct serious negotiations to this end. China has consistently supported those resolutions and the initiative. China also supports the resolution on the Middle East issue adopted by the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

China has actively promoted the establishment of the Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone at the bilateral level. In high-level meetings with leaders of Middle Eastern countries, China has expressed its appreciation of their efforts towards establishing the Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and maintained its clear-cut position on supporting the establishment of such a zone.

In December 2003, Libya decided to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programmes, which included a nuclear-weapons programme. China welcomes this decision, believing that it would contribute to upholding the international non-proliferation regime as well as promote peace and stability in the region.

China believes that Israel should accede to the NPT and place all of its nuclear facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. Countries in the Middle East should ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol as soon as possible. All these would be of great significance for achieving the goal of promoting the universality of the NPT and reinforcing the international non-proliferation regime.

China has consistently maintained that the Iranian nuclear issue should be resolved in a peaceful manner through diplomatic negotiations. To this end, China calls on the parties concerned to enhance diplomatic efforts to resume negotiations as soon as possible and, through negotiations, to find a long-term, comprehensive and appropriate solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. China vigorously takes part in the international diplomatic efforts to promote the resumption of the negotiations. China will continue to play a constructive role in appropriately resolving the Iranian nuclear issue.

China is ready to work with the international community to make continued efforts for and contribute to the achievement of a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East and the establishment of the Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone at an early date.

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

9 May 2007

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Implementation of article VI

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

The present report is prepared in accordance with subparagraph 12 of paragraph 15 in the chapter on article VI of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and deals with measures that have been taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that reporting, as envisaged in step 12 of the 13 practical steps, provides an essential element to ascertain the implementation of obligations assumed under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran holds the view that the objectivity of our analysis on the progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament would be best served through adoption of a format properly defining categories of information required within the review strengthening process.

2. One of the important elements of step 12 is that the 2000 Review Conference recalled the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 in conjunction with the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. As the Court stipulated in its advisory opinion in 1996, "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law ...", and "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control". The Islamic Republic of Iran, emphasizes the importance and validity of the advisory opinion of the Court as a universal disarmament obligation of States parties and non-parties to the NPT, and accordingly believes that, while reporting on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty is important, it shall not substitute for the fulfilment of the obligation of nuclear disarmament under article VI. It is disappointing that 37 years after the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the obligations under article VI have yet to be fulfilled. More than 60 years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the long-lasting threat to human survival from nuclear weapons continues to be the greatest threat to humanity. The international community is gravely concerned with the lack of

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progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, some 27,000 (or tens of thousands of) nuclear weapons still exist, many on high alert status, long after the end of the cold war.

Iran's approach towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty

3. The Islamic Republic of Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969 and ratified it in February 1970. In June 1973, in accordance with paragraph 1 of article III of the Treaty, Iran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons before its entry into force and early conclusion of the safeguards agreement clearly demonstrates our long-standing support and commitment as a non-nuclear-weapon State to this fundamental instrument.

4. In 1974, Iran was the first country in the Middle East region to initiate the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which was followed vigorously by the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. The Islamic Republic of Iran actively participated in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and joined others in supporting the indefinite extension of the Treaty, with the hope that the agreed package would pave the way for the early and total elimination of nuclear weapons.

5. The Islamic Republic of Iran has fulfilled its obligations under all provisions of the Treaty in the hope of helping the integrity and universality of the NPT regime and achieving its fundamental objectives. Iran's position to denounce the nuclear option, as a matter of principle, and place its peaceful nuclear facilities under the full scope safeguards agreement is a clear manifestation of our commitment to a strong Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran considers the acquiring, development and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, and illegal and against its very basic principles. They have no place in Iran's defence doctrine, not only because of our commitment to our contractual obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and our religious orders, but in fact because of a sober strategic calculation: they do not add to Iran's security nor do they help rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, which is in Iran's supreme interests.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that all provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are of equal importance. Maintaining the balance of the rights and obligations enshrined in the Treaty preserves its integrity, enhances its credibility and encourages the Treaty's universality and full implementation.

7. In accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty, as agreed in the 2000 Review Conference, should be vigorously pursued by nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, no action shall be made by any State, in particular nuclear-weapon States, in contravention of those obligations. Regrettably, the new nuclear doctrine of the United States of America, through development of new types of nuclear weapons, setting rationales for the possible use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and naming non-nuclear-weapon States as the targets of such new

inhuman weapons, and the recent United Kingdom Trident Project to build a new generation of nuclear armed submarines are all flagrant violations of international law, obligations under article VI of the Treaty and the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States in the 2000 Review Conference. In addition, the United States continuously has refrained from giving positive response to the demand of the international community to start negotiations on the treaty of negative security assurances, and the treaty on nuclear disarmament, and increasingly is devoting billions of dollars for programmes of vertical proliferation of its nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, by continuing the deployment of hundreds of nuclear weapons, planning for deployment of nuclear warheads and defence missile systems in other countries and training the air forces of those countries to deliver those weapons in the framework of military alliances, and by transferring nuclear technology and materials to the non-members of the NPT whose nuclear facilities are operating outside the IAEA full scope safeguards monitoring, the United States is in non-compliance with article I of the Treaty, which stipulates that each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons, as well as in non-compliance with article VI of the Treaty, which sets out the complete disarmament commitments of the nuclear-weapon States.

Measures taken to implement article VI of the Treaty

8. The Islamic Republic of Iran has actively participated in international efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Initiatives taken towards this noble goal have always enjoyed our full support. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran sponsored General Assembly resolution 60/72 on follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran has also voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions such as resolution 61/97, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons"; resolution 61/56 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; resolution 61/57 on the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; resolution 61/65, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments"; resolution 59/77 on nuclear disarmament; resolution 61/85 on reducing nuclear danger; resolution 59/81, concerning a fissile material cut-off treaty; resolution 61/103 on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East; resolution 61/104 on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and resolution 61/83 on follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*; and other relevant resolutions adopted in the United Nations and other international forums.

9. In line with other members of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Republic of Iran has in various forums, including the International Court of Justice, made its position clear that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is contrary to international law and is therefore illegal. The Islamic Republic of Iran has continuously supported the resolution adopted annually since 1999, on follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*.

10. Iran fully supports the early establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament, with a mandate to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a nuclear weapons convention, as a concrete step for nuclear disarmament.

11. The Islamic Republic of Iran played a prominent role during the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, hoping that the conclusion of that Treaty would prevent the qualitative as well as quantitative development of nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran as a signatory of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an active member of the Preparatory Commission and hosts five International Monitoring System stations. The 2000 Conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed among 13 practical steps to a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its serious concern that the United States has decided to accelerate "testing readiness" to enable it to reduce the time needed for resuming underground nuclear tests to 18 months. This will clearly put into question the commitment of the United States to the continuation of its already declared testing moratorium.

12. Owing to the significant role that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones plays in achieving a world entirely free from nuclear weapons, in 1974 Iran initiated the resolution for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Since 1980, this resolution has been adopted annually by consensus in the General Assembly. However, the Zionist regime, confident of the political and military support of the United States through its persistent rejection of accession to any international disarmament instrument, and in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, remains the main obstacle to the establishment of such a zone.

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

9 May 2007

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

In accordance with subparagraph 7 of paragraph 16 (regional issues) of the section of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference concerning article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which deals with steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran reports the following:

1. Iran first initiated the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as an important disarmament measure in the region of the Middle East in 1974, followed by the resolution of the General Assembly. Since 1980, the General Assembly has annually adopted, by consensus, a resolution on this issue. Continuous adoption of this resolution at the General Assembly is the manifestation of the global support for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Middle East through the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

2. As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to its international undertakings and believes that this international instrument is the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Universal adherence to this Treaty, in particular in the region of the Middle East, would effectively ensure the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. Currently, the Zionist Regime is the only non-party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the region. Despite repeated calls by the international community demonstrated in the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, related resolutions of the General Assembly as well as of the IAEA and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Zionist Regime, confident of the political and military support of the United States, has neither acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nor placed its unwarranted nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. It has not even declared its intention to accede to the Treaty. This Regime's clandestine nuclear activities, with the support of the

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United States, seriously threaten both regional and international peace and security, and endanger the non-proliferation regime.

3. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons reaffirmed the importance of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Owing to the significant provisions of that resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran and other States in the region truly expect that the resolution should be swiftly implemented, especially by its sponsors, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as depositories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

4. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirmed "the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East." Unconditional adherence by the Zionist Regime to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and conclusion of a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA would, undoubtedly, lead to the early realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Neglecting the commitments undertaken by States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the adoption of this important resolution can only embolden that Regime to continue to remain a source of threat and instability in the Middle East by flouting the aspirations of the international community and remaining outside of the fold of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the full-scope safeguards regime. In this context, we believe that national reports do not address the negative implications of the Zionist Regime's intransigence to join the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and are not as effective as they ought to be with regard to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

5. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in implementing its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and specifically articles II and III of the Treaty, reaffirms that all its nuclear facilities are devoted to peaceful purposes and are under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. Furthermore, contributing to the realization of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the Middle East, Iran has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as well as ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Iran's high record of accession, among the Middle East countries, to the non-proliferation and disarmament instruments is not only a clear manifestation of our firm commitment to the cause of disarmament and non-proliferation, but also is evidence of our dedicated efforts towards the noble goal of the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in its bilateral and multilateral disarmament dialogues with other States parties to the Treaty, in particular with some nuclear-weapon States and members of the European Union, has always urged their active contribution towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

7. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the firm belief that an agreed plan of action and timetable for the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons especially in the Middle East, should be a top priority on the agenda of all

parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular nuclear-weapon States. There should be greater pressure on the Zionist Regime to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, promptly and without conditions, and to place all of its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards to pave the way for the long-sought goal of the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

8. Unfortunately, the inaction imposed upon the Security Council over the past several decades in addressing the well-documented illicit nuclear weapons programme implemented by the Zionist Regime, has given the audacity to this regime to explicitly acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons, as has been divulged by its Prime Minister in an interview on television German on 12 December 2006, in contradiction to the long-sought idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Moreover, this Regime's clandestine development and possession of nuclear weapons not only violate basic principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as numerous General Assembly, Security Council and IAEA General Conference resolutions, but also clearly defy the demands and concerns of the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations and constantly and obstinately disregard the international community, which has, time and again, called on this regime to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT. Over and above, the Non-Aligned Movement in New York in its statement dated 5 February 2007, expressed its great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by the Zionist Regime, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemned that Regime on its action and the said statement in this regard, and for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals.

The Security Council should fulfil its Charter-based responsibility to address such a clear and serious threat to international peace and security and take prompt and appropriate actions accordingly. The Zionist Regime is the only obstacle for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Peace and stability can not be achieved in the Middle East while the massive nuclear arsenal of this Regime continues to threaten the region and beyond. It is a matter of regret that while no practical measure is taken to contain the threat of such Regime as the real source of nuclear danger in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran as a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the initiator of the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is under tremendous pressure to renounce its inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

9. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the opinion that, pending the realization of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, no country of the region must develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing, on its territories or on territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, and they should refrain from action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international resolutions and documents relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

10. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a significant

role in the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Review Conference of 2010 should establish a subsidiary body under Main Committee II to consider this issue and make concrete recommendations on urgent and practical steps for the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The Review Conference should also make recommendations on the measures to force the Zionist Regime to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and place its unwarranted nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards to pave the way for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East region.

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapo ns

8 May 2007

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Agenda*

1. Opening of the session.
2. Election of the Chairman.
3. Adoption of the agenda.
4. General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee.
5. Statements by non-governmental organizations.
6. Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East, adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of the 1975, 1985, 2000 and 2005 Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty, and thereby considering approaches and measures to realize its purpose, reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty.[1]
7. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee:
   (a) Election of officers;
   (b) Dates and venues for further sessions;
   (c) Methods of work:
      (i) Decision-making;
      (ii) Participation;
      (iii) Working languages;
      (iv) Records and documents.

* Adopted at the 12th meeting of the Preparatory Committee on 8 May 2007.

[1] The Committee decides that it understands the reference in the agenda to "reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty" to mean that it will consider compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty.

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8. Report on the results of the session to the next session of the Preparatory Committee.

9. Organization of the 2010 Review Conference:

   (a) Dates and venue;

   (b) Draft rules of procedure;

   (c) Election of the President and other officers;

   (d) Appointment of the Secretary-General;

   (e) Provisional agenda;

   (f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee;

   (g) Background documentation;

   (h) Final document(s).

10. Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference.

11. Any other matters.

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

9 May 2007

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"

Report submitted by Malaysia

1. Malaysia reiterates its commitment to pursue the long-term goal of total and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons, and underscores the importance of the multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

2. Malaysia signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 1 July 1968, and ratified it on 3 May 1970, and remains committed to its obligations under the Treaty. Pursuant to its obligations under the Treaty, a comprehensive safeguards Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the NPT was subsequently concluded on 29 February 1972.

3. In addition, a trilateral Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the United States of America, and the IAEA, Concerning the Transfer of a Research Reactor and Enriched Uranium, or IAEA Project and Supply Agreement, was also concluded on 20 September 1980. This agreement can be considered as a back-up safeguards agreement to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, with respect to the only nuclear research reactor that Malaysia has procured.

4. Malaysia signed the Protocol Additional to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on 22 November 2005, and is currently taking steps to institutionalize its obligations under this Additional Protocol through a comprehensive review and update of its national nuclear-related laws and regulations.

5. With a view to achieving the universalization of the Treaty, Malaysia urges the three non-signatory States that remain outside the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Pending the accession of these three States to the NPT, Malaysia calls upon all States, including nuclear-weapon States, to impose a total

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and complete prohibition on the transfer of all nuclear-related material, resources, assistance and cooperation in nuclear scientific and technological fields to States that are non-parties to the Treaty, without exception. On this matter, Malaysia is of the view that such a state of affairs, whereby any non-party of the NPT is accorded preferential treatment in comparison to the NPT States parties, constitutes a gross violation of the spirit and letter of the Treaty.

6. Malaysia signed the Comprehensive-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 23 July 1998 and is finalizing a draft enabling legislation to facilitate ratification of the CTBT. While it is not among the States listed in annex 2 to the CTBT, Malaysia continues to urge the remaining 10 of the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty to take the necessary steps to sign or accede to and ratify the CTBT to facilitate its early entry into force. Pending entry into force of the Treaty, Malaysia urges the moratorium on nuclear tests to be sustained. Malaysia remains resolutely opposed to the conduct of nuclear tests by any country.

7. Malaysia continues to strongly believe in the need for undertaking genuine and concrete measures towards complete and irreversible nuclear disarmament, and also on the need for this matter to be accorded a priority position in the international agenda. Towards this end, Malaysia had, for the tenth consecutive year, at the sixty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, introduced a resolution concerning the Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, which continues to receive overwhelming support from a majority of Member States. In that resolution (61/83), among others, the General Assembly continues to underscore the unanimous conclusion of the Court that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

8. Malaysia believes that the final objective of all measures aimed at achieving complete and irreversible nuclear disarmament should ultimately lead to the conclusion and adoption of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Towards that end, Malaysia has been working with global civil society in promoting this objective. In this regard, Malaysia strongly believes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons constitutes the only durable prescription and guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons of mass destruction, and their proliferation among States and non-States parties.

9. In the interim, Malaysia calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from undertaking measures to either, develop new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons, qualitatively improve existing nuclear arsenals, or adopt new strategic defence doctrines, which may set out the rationale for first use of nuclear weapons, and lower the threshold for their use. Malaysia is also opposed to any unilateral or selective reinterpretation of the provisions of the NPT, particularly on the obligations of the nuclear-weapons States to pursue general and complete nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty, so as not to undermine the confidence of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the underlying original bargain of the Treaty.

10. At the regional level, Malaysia signed the Treaty on the South-east Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) on 15 December 1995, and ratified it on 11 October 1996. Malaysia is also continuing to work actively with other member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to this Treaty,

particularly in encouraging the nuclear-weapon States to accede as parties to the Protocol to the Treaty at an early date. Malaysia believes that this Treaty would create conditions conducive to durable peace and stability, and promote the building of confidence in the region. Malaysia is also of the view that the accession to the Protocol to the Treaty by nuclear-weapons States would effectively constitute a negative security assurance to the regional States parties of such nuclear-weapons-free zones.

11. Malaysia has also been consistently supportive of the strengthening of existing, and establishment of new nuclear-weapons-free zones, towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. Of particular importance is the call for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, which Malaysia considers to be a matter of utmost urgency, in view of the increasing volatility in that region.

12. As a State party that has long disavowed nuclear weapons, Malaysia firmly values and reaffirms the inalienable right of States parties, particularly developing non-nuclear-weapon States parties, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy, as well as the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with their respective safeguards agreements, as enshrined under article IV of the Treaty. Malaysia has benefited greatly from the Technical Cooperation Programme of the IAEA, which is being reinforced by other regional and bilateral cooperative arrangements among NPT States parties and IAEA member States. From a recipient country, Malaysia is gradually becoming more of a donor country under the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme in terms of the provision of experts to other developing countries.

13. Malaysia is cognizant of the fact that all Member States are obliged to implement United Nations Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) as one of the means of addressing concerns over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery and related goods, equipment and technology. In this regard, Malaysia continues to fully implement the provisions of the resolutions under the existing domestic legal framework.

14. Malaysia is deeply concerned with the practice of selectivity and discrimination, as well as the trend towards unilateralism in dictating the limits of research, production and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Malaysia calls upon the NPT States parties, particularly the advanced States parties in terms of nuclear technology development, to live up to their obligations in upholding the principles of transparency and non-discrimination, to ensure that all NPT States parties can benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

15. On this matter, Malaysia reaffirms its full confidence in the role and professional ability of the IAEA to act as the sole verification Agency in ensuring the compliance of States parties with the nuclear non-proliferation safeguards provisions under the NPT. Malaysia further believes that the IAEA should be afforded the necessary time and space to undertake this verification role without undue interference.

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

10 May 2007

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by New Zealand

Article I

1. New Zealand views the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to non-transfer and other controls under this article as essential. This commitment is also important in the context of the threat of the acquisition of such items by non-State actors.

Article II

2. New Zealand fully meets its commitment under this article in all respects. New Zealand's obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are legislated in the New Zealand Nuclear-Free-Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987. New Zealand's concerns about compliance by other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have been expressed in various forums, for example at the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Article III

3. The Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and New Zealand came into force on 29 February 1972, and the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement was concluded on 24 September 1998. In 2001, IAEA assessed New Zealand as being in full compliance with all its safeguards commitments. With no nuclear weapons, no nuclear energy generation, no nuclear reactor and no production of uranium or other relevant material, New Zealand has only very minor activities subject to safeguards. New Zealand, as a State with a small quantities protocol, is supportive of the decision of IAEA and its efforts to modify the small quantities protocol to address the weakness in the safeguards system identified by the Agency.

4. New Zealand applies export controls to materials and dual-use goods that can be used in a nuclear weapons programme. It coordinates these with other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which New Zealand joined in 1994.

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Article IV

5. New Zealand reaffirms the inalienable right of States parties to peaceful nuclear technology, as long as it is exercised in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

6. New Zealand has rejected nuclear power generation for itself. New Zealand does not consider nuclear power compatible with the concept of sustainable development, given the long-term costs, both financial and ecological, of nuclear waste and the risk of nuclear proliferation.

7. New Zealand has been active at such forums as the IAEA General Conference in promoting close attention to the safe transport of radioactive materials and radioactive waste. New Zealand is concerned that there be the highest possible safety standards and that they be applied fully, that coastal and other interested States receive notification in advance of shipments and that adequate liability arrangements be in place.

Article V

8. New Zealand supports the outcome of the 1995 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference that article V should be interpreted in light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

9. New Zealand ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in March 1999. In New Zealand, the Treaty has been enacted in the Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999. A ban on nuclear testing is also included in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the New Zealand Nuclear-Free-Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987.

Article VI

10. With its partners in the New Agenda Coalition, New Zealand has worked hard to promote the negotiations in good faith relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. In this context, New Zealand draws strength from the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

11. At the United Nations in 2006, New Zealand, with the New Agenda Coalition, was a lead sponsor of resolution 61/65 (Towards a nuclear weapon free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments), which highlighted the limited progress on many issues relating to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and called upon States to abide fully by their commitments.

12. At the Conference on Disarmament, New Zealand remains supportive of proposals for a programme of work, including on nuclear disarmament, fissile materials, negative security assurances and outer space. Commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty without preconditions would make a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Article VII

13. New Zealand is a full party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 1985 (the Treaty of Rarotonga, also enacted in the New Zealand Nuclear-Free-Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987). All the independent countries of the South Pacific are now covered by the Treaty, and four of the nuclear-weapon States (the United Kingdom, China, France and the Russian Federation) have ratified protocols giving security assurances to the region. The United States of America has signed the protocols.

14. New Zealand continues to believe in the valuable contribution that nuclear-weapon-free zones can make towards nuclear disarmament. The establishment of a southern hemisphere nuclear-weapon-free zone remains a key objective for New Zealand and New Zealand works with Brazil in the United Nations General Assembly to advance this initiative.

Article VIII

15. New Zealand supports the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as it stands. New Zealand will participate fully in the eighth Review Conference of the Treaty and its Preparatory Committees.

Article IX

16. New Zealand continues to emphasize the importance of universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, calling on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States in accordance with article IX.

17. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's announced withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains of concern to New Zealand. New Zealand strongly supports the six party talks and hopes that this process will eventually lead to the return of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to active membership of the Treaty, meeting its NPT obligations and resuming cooperation with IAEA.

Article X

18. New Zealand joined the consensus decision in 1995 that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons be extended indefinitely. The 1995 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted a package of decisions in 1995: strengthening the review process; Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; extension of the Treaty; and the resolution on the Middle East. All these elements remain extant. In New Zealand's view, the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was not a permit for the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.

Thirteen steps

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

19. New Zealand ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in March 1999, having taken an active part in its negotiation. At the United Nations General Assembly in 2006, New Zealand was a core sponsor of resolution 61/104 (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty), which reiterated the call for universal ratification of that Treaty. In 2006, New Zealand co-sponsored a joint ministerial statement on the Treaty, which Ministers delivered in New York. New Zealand works closely with the Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna on issues relating to the Treaty. Pending ratification of the Treaty, New Zealand has been active in the establishment of an International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and has set up six monitoring stations on its territory. New Zealand cooperates closely with Fiji, the Cook Islands and Kiribati on the installation of monitoring stations in the Pacific region.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

20. New Zealand endorsed a joint ministerial statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2006, which called upon "all States to continue a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions" pending official ratification of the Treaty. New Zealand has worked with Pacific countries to put in place the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which bans nuclear testing. Twenty years ago New Zealand also established a New Zealand nuclear-free-zone with the passage of the New Zealand Nuclear-Free-Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work, which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

21. New Zealand has actively supported moves to overcome the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to agree a programme of work. We support the current six Presidents' proposal which would see a negotiation commencing on a fissile material cut-off treaty and substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and outer space.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

22. New Zealand supports efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work, in particular the current proposal of the six Presidents, which would see the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and outer space.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

23. New Zealand has argued, in partnership with the New Agenda Coalition, that irreversibility in nuclear disarmament, nuclear reductions and other related nuclear arms control measures is imperative. The New Agenda Coalition resolution to the United Nations General Assembly in 2006 (61/65) reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to the nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

24. New Zealand, in partnership with the New Agenda Coalition, urges States to live up to the unequivocal undertaking jointly agreed at the 2000 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference, for the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. This undertaking remains extant. New Zealand has reminded States of their obligations through various statements in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The unequivocal undertaking on the part of all Treaty signatory States is a foundation on which the New Agenda Coalition continues to build.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

25. New Zealand notes that START II and START III have been discarded following the withdrawal of the United States from the Treaty on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems in 2002. The Moscow Treaty (2002) represents a positive first step in the process of nuclear de-escalation between the United States and the Russian Federation, through undertakings to reduce the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads. However, New Zealand emphasizes, through the New Agenda Coalition, that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible destruction of weapons towards the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

26. New Zealand supports the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and IAEA.

9. Steps by all nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international security for all:

- *Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.*
- *Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant*

to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

- *The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.*
- *Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems.*
- *A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.*
- *The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.*

27. New Zealand supports the full range of measures outlined in this step and remains committed to achieving progress on these measures in the next review cycle.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

28. New Zealand recognizes and welcomes the fact that all non-nuclear-weapon States have already accepted full controls on fissile materials. These controls are verified and administered by IAEA. New Zealand urges nuclear-weapon States to adopt similar commitments in this area.

29. New Zealand supports the early negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material or other nuclear explosive devices. New Zealand welcomes efforts currently under way in the Conference on Disarmament to secure negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

30. The New Zealand Government engages in a wide range of disarmament work relating to weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. Through active membership of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, New Zealand campaigns for progress towards the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand is also playing a leading role in international efforts to better regulate the use of certain conventional weapons, particularly cluster munitions. There is close cooperation between New Zealand and Pacific neighbours on efforts to reduce and control the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. New Zealand also belongs to four major export control regimes: the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph (4) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

31. New Zealand submitted a report to the seventh review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which set out New Zealand's progress with regard to each article of the Treaty.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

32. New Zealand has given strong support to a system of strengthened IAEA safeguards, including in regional disarmament discussions. The IAEA safeguards system is an essential component of the global non-proliferation regime. IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are meeting their undertakings under the Treaty and provide the mechanism for States to demonstrate their compliance. Universal application of the integrated safeguards system, including the Additional Protocols, would promote collective security. New Zealand continues to call upon those States which have not yet concluded any safeguards agreement with IAEA to do so at the earliest possible date.

Resolution on the Middle East: New Zealand progress

Operative paragraph 1

33. The New Zealand Government's long-standing policy has been to take a balanced and constructive approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. New Zealand upholds Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders. At the same time, New Zealand considers that the Palestinians have the right to self-determination and to a viable and territorially contiguous state. New Zealand supports the negotiation of a just, enduring and comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, in line with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and the principles derived from successive agreements between the two parties. Any change or departure from the pre-1967 borders would have to be subject to agreement by both sides.

34. New Zealand also supports wider stabilization efforts through diplomacy, peacekeeping deployments, targeted aid assistance and diplomatic support for international negotiations.

Operative paragraph 2

35. New Zealand, in partnership with the New Agenda Coalition, emphasizes the importance of universal accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. New Zealand calls upon all States that have not yet done so, including Israel, to sign and ratify the Treaty, and to bring into force comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

10 May 2007

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"

Report submitted by Norway

1. The present report sets out steps taken by Norway to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". In the previous review cycle, Norway reported on its contribution to the implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Norway reconfirms its previous reports and reiterates its support for those steps.

2. Since the 2005 Review Conference, Norway has continued to promote a comprehensive approach where the three pillars of the NPT — nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use — mutually support each other, in the following ways:

- In the lead-up to the United Nations Summit, Norway, together with Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, presented concrete proposals with a view to further strengthening the three pillars of the NPT. The proposals received widespread support.
- Norway organized an international workshop in Oslo in August 2005 on the way forward for consolidating the NPT.
- Norway and Indonesia organized a regional workshop on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Bali in November 2006.
- In the General Assembly, Norway has supported and co-sponsored resolutions calling for renewed efforts to reach a nuclear-weapon-free world.

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- Norway welcomes the fact that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have initiated talks on the further reduction of strategic arsenals given that START expires in 2009 and SORT expires in 2012.
- Norway continues to advocate the full implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons and reach legally binding agreements.
- Norway reiterates the principles of nuclear disarmament: transparency, irreversibility and verification.
- Norway has continued to advocate enhanced transparency with respect to nuclear holdings and steps taken towards nuclear disarmament.
- In the conference on disarmament, Norway supported renewed efforts to reach consensus on a programme of work on the basis of the Six Presidents' proposal. Norway has coordinated deliberations on nuclear disarmament. Norway has advocated an early commencement on negotiations, without preconditions, on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. Pending such a treaty, Norway has repeated its call to all nuclear weapon States to declare or reconfirm the moratorium on the production of nuclear weapons material.
- Norway continues to support international efforts to ensure an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In the meantime, Norway has reiterated the need to sustain the non-test norm.
- Norway has supported resolutions calling for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East in the General Assembly and General Conference of the IAEA.
- Norway has advocated the full universalization of the Additional Protocol and that the implementation of that Protocol be considered a condition for taking part in peaceful nuclear cooperation.
- Norway has supported the establishment of the IAEA Committee on Safeguards and Verification. Norway has taken an active part in the deliberations of the Committee, and regrets the lack of progress in its work.
- Norway supports Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and has, since 2005, provided financial support for regional efforts to promote national non-proliferation measures.
- In 2005 and 2006, Norway was Chair of the Plenary of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, focusing on enhanced dialogue with countries not taking part in the Group.
- Norway participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative and supports the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Norway has contributed financially to that partnership.
- In the NPT and IAEA, Norway has called for efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector. In June 2006, Norway hosted an international symposium on highly enriched uranium minimization in the civilian sector.

- In IAEA, Norway has called for predictable and sufficient funding of safety activities.
- Within IAEA, Norway has also emphasized the need for enhanced technical cooperation on peaceful nuclear applications as part of overall efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals. In this respect, Norway ntributed 4 million Norwegian Krone (NKr) for the IAEA Nobel Cancer and Nutrition fund.
- The Norwegian Government has enhanced its cooperation with research institutions from different countries on ways to promote nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use. In 2006, Norwegian authorities allocated NKr 11 million to that end. This amount was more than doubled in 2007.
- Norway has financially supported efforts to promote non-proliferation and disarmament education.

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

10 May 2007

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Note verbale dated 10 May 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Cuba, on behalf of the Group of States Parties to the NPT that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cuba to the International Organizations in Vienna, on behalf of the Group of States Parties to the NPT that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, presents its compliments to the secretariat of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the statement of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on the statement of the Israeli Prime Minister regarding Israel's possession of nuclear weapons (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cuba to the International Organizations in Vienna kindly requests that the statement be circulated as a document of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

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Annex to the note verbale dated 10 May 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Cuba, on behalf of the Group of States Parties to the NPT that are members of the Non-Aligned Movement

Statement of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on the recent statement of the Israeli Prime Minister regarding Israel's possession of nuclear weapons

The Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in New York considered at its meeting on 16 January 2007, the statement made by the Prime Minister of Israel on 11 December 2006, in which he publicly admitted the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel.

The NAM Coordinating Bureau, gravely concerned by the said statement, reaffirmed the principled positions of the Movement on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation reflected in various NAM documents including the Final Document of the Sixteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana, Cuba from 11 to 16 September 2006.

The NAM Coordinating Bureau reiterated its support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. To this end, the Bureau reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus, and stressed that necessary steps should be taken in different international forums for the establishment of this zone.

The NAM Coordinating Bureau expressed its great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemned Israel on its action and the said statement in this regard, and for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals.

The NAM Coordinating Bureau demanded on Israel, the only one in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards according to Security Council resolution 487 (1981), and to conduct its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime.

New York, 5 February 2007

Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

11 May 2007

Original: English

First session
Vienna, 30 April-11 May 2007

Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"

Report submitted by Ireland

1. States parties agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that there should be regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

2. Ireland hereby submits its report to the first Preparatory Committee meeting of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

3. During the last NPT Review Conference in 2005, Ireland participated actively, including as a member both of the New Agenda Coalition and of the European Union.

4. In 2006, Ireland, together with its partners in the New Agenda Coalition, co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 61/65 (Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments).

Implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" included in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference:

Step 1

The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

5. Ireland ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in July 1999 and has advocated the urgent need for its entry into force without delay and without

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conditions. Ireland has worked in support of this objective within the European Union and the New Agenda Coalition. Ireland continues to see the Treaty as one of the fundamental building blocks in a step by step approach on the road to nuclear disarmament.

Step 2

A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion pending entry into force of that Treaty.

6. Ireland, along with its European Union partners, has urged all States to abide by a moratorium pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to refrain from any actions which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the Treaty.

Step 3

The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work, which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

7. Ireland has been a member of the Conference on Disarmament since 1999 and has actively supported efforts to break the deadlock on the work programme. While disappointed that it has not proved possible to meet the deadline set for the conclusion of a fissile material treaty, Ireland has been encouraged by the structured and substantive debates at the Conference on Disarmament in 2006 and early in 2007. These have helped generate a new momentum. Ireland strongly supports the formal proposal tabled recently by the 2007 six Presidents and hopes that this can break the deadlock and enable substantive work to resume. We maintain the view that this year the Conference on Disarmament should begin negotiations without preconditions on a treaty dealing with fissile material. We believe that for such a treaty to be meaningful it must include a verification mechanism and cover existing stocks.

Step 4

The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

8. In addition, Ireland continues to favour the early establishment of a subsidiary body to deal specifically with the issue of nuclear disarmament. We also see merit in embarking on a process that will eventually lead to an agreement on the non-weaponization of outer space.

Step 5

The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

9. The principle of irreversibility is a fundamental one which must be applied to all disarmament and arms control measures (regardless of whether they are unilateral, bilateral or multilateral). Ireland considers the application of this principle is the only guarantee against the possibility of redeployment.

Step 6

An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

10. Ireland as a member of the New Agenda Coalition continues to press for verifiable progress under this step. The fulfilment, by the nuclear-weapon States, of this unequivocal undertaking is a basic necessity for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Step 7

The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

11. Developments since 2000 have not removed the need for a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons. Ireland notes the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation but questions its contribution to effective nuclear disarmament. As we have emphasized, through the New Agenda Coalition, reductions in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads, while welcome, are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.

Step 8

The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

12. Ireland continues to support this initiative and would welcome regular updates on progress from the parties involved.

Step 9

Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- *Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.*
- *Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant*

to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

- *The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.*
- *Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.*
- *A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.*
- *The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.*

13. As a non-nuclear weapon State, Ireland can only press for progress on the implementation of these steps. We have stressed in particular the importance of the principle of transparency contained in this step. In the interests of transparency, and as a baseline for future disarmament measures, Ireland has called upon the nuclear-weapon States to publish their aggregate holdings of nuclear weapons on active and reserve status, and to do so in a consistent and uniform manner. Together with the principles of irreversibility and verification, this should apply to all disarmament and arms control efforts.

Step 10

Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

14. Ireland calls on nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so to make such arrangements.

Step 11

Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

15. Ireland works actively in a number of disarmament forums and is a State party, inter alia, to the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Ottawa Convention. Speaking in his statement to the last NPT Review Conference in 2005, Ireland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dermot Ahern T.D., reaffirmed "our faith in the multilateral regime of disarmament and in non-proliferation treaties and agreements which provide the legal and normative basis for all our efforts. We remain committed to upholding, implementing and strengthening these instruments and to pursuing actively the universalization of the norms they set out". Ireland is also active in working within the European Union to strengthen the Union's policy on weapons of mass destruction.

16. Ireland also participates in a number of multilateral export control forums, namely the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Zangger Committee. Ireland sees effective export control as complementary to multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control efforts.

Step 12

Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

17. Ireland considers regular reporting to be a key element of the 13 steps and presented reports during the last NPT review cycle. Ireland views reporting not as an end in itself but as an important tool in strengthening the NPT process, through greater transparency.

Step 13

The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

18. The 2000 Review Conference specifically endorsed the measures of the Model Additional Protocol approved by IAEA. Ireland fully supports IAEA in its verification tasks and strongly favours a system of strengthened IAEA Safeguards. We have urged all States, regardless of the size or nature of their nuclear programme, which have not yet signed and ratified an Additional Protocol to do so.